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A Tale of Two Casinos: Unequal Spaces of Local Governance
ALEXANDRA FLYNN*
Local actors, including resident and business associations, do not simply influence
decision-makers, but can also reshape the purportedly neutral governance model
within which decision-making takes place. In big cities like Toronto, this reshaping
exacerbates the existing geographic and socio-economic unevenness. The work of
James Scott, Mariana Valverde, and Cheryl Teelucksingh helps to explain how local
actors interface with seemingly neutral governance bodies to have their interests
heard, particularly in relation to locally undesirable land uses. The paper considers
two case studies detailing the governance practices at work in differing decisions
about casinos in the City of Toronto. A 2012-2013 debate about a casino in
downtown Toronto saw a little-used bylaw invoked by city councillors to help them
investigate the effects of a casino on “local” issues like traffic and planning. These
empowered local actors played a central role in the debate. By contrast, in a 2015
debate about a casino in a poor neighborhood on the margins of the city, the debate
proceeded through the usual decision-making process for “city-wide” deliberations,
leading to fewer opportunities for involvement by local actors. The final section
brings theoretical literature and case studies together to conclude that the
institutions of local governance can be reshaped depending on the local actors
involved, and claims that shifts in scale, from local to city-wide, have implications for
the inclusivity and fairness of Toronto’s governance model.

*
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ROMANTIC STORIES ABOUND OF RESIDENTS RESHAPING CITIES, fighting for pizza and
tandoori ovens in Toronto’s parks, or getting court protection for beloved graffiti art in
Brooklyn.1 These stories have echoes in James Scott’s Seeing Like a State, where he lamented
top-down planned cities like Brasilia, while extolling Jane Jacobs’ New York, which allowed
residents to continuously recreate the city through a series of informal, “bottom-up,” streetlevel practices. 2 Mariana Valverde challenged Scott’s oversimplification of governance
arguing that premodern and modern gazes are not mutually exclusive. 3 Rather than
adopting a single lens to understand how municipal rules are made, Valverde cautions us to
see the hybrid forms of rule-making that operate unpredictably and which epitomize
modern land use planning.
Through examining the legal institutions of Toronto’s governance model, I enter this
debate to argue that local actors, including resident and business associations, do not simply
influence decision-makers, but can also reshape the purportedly neutral governance model within
which decision-making takes place. This reshaping exacerbates the existing geographic and socioeconomic unevenness of big cities like Toronto. I focus on two recent casino decisions taken by
the City of Toronto. The first, in 2012-2013, involved casino development in Toronto’s dense and
affluent downtown core. The second, in 2015, concerned the expansion of an existing racetrack in
a poor, suburban area of the city. 4 In the 2012-2013 casino debate, several downtown casino
options were identified as possible locations for a new casino in the City of Toronto. All were
soundly rejected by City Council. In 2015, the expansion of the Ontario Lottery and Gaming
(OLG) slots at the Woodbine Racetrack to a casino in Rexdale was approved quickly and with
little community deliberation.5
This study is part of an ongoing account of the governance of cities, in particular the
dis/empowerment of particular local actors.6 Part I situates the paper within relevant literature,
City of Toronto Staff, “Policy on Outdoor Ovens in City Parks,” Parks and Environment Committee (29 August
2011), online: </www.toronto.ca/legdocs/mmis/2011/pe/bgrd/backgroundfile-41502.pdf> [perma.cc/XK93-YADH];
Jennifer Bain, “Intersections: Tandoor oven one more reason to love R.V. Burgess Park,” Toronto Star (4 July 2014),
online:
<www.thestar.com/life/food_wine/2014/07/04/intersections_tandoor_oven_one_more_reason_to_love_rv_burgess_park.htm
l> [perma.cc:BWT5-YTNQ]; Alan Feuer, “Graffiti Artists Awarded $6.7 Million for Destroyed 5Pointz Murals,” New
York Times (12 February 2018) at A17, online: <www.nytimes.com/2018/02/12/nyregion/5pointz-graffitijudgment.html> [perma.cc/K6S4-8JXK] .
2
James Scott, Seeing Like a State: How Certain Schemes to Improve the Human Condition Have Failed (New
Haven: Yale University Press, 1998).
3
Mariana Valverde, “Seeing Like a City: The Dialectic of Modern and Premodern Ways of Seeing in Urban
Governance” (2011) 45:2 Law & Soc’y Rev 277 at 281.
4
This article does not reference the debates held in 2008 regarding the potential expansion of the Woodbine
Racetrack to create a casino. For more information on these debates, see Steven Tufts, “Schumpeterian Unionism
and ‘High-Road’ Dreams in Toronto’s Hospitality Sector” in Ann Cecelie Bergene et al, eds, Missing Links in
Labour Geography (Surrey: Ashgate, 2010) 83.
5
Thus the proposed casino in Rexdale is often referred to as a casino at Woodbine racetrack or the Woodbine
expansion.
6
See eg. Carissa Schively, “Understanding the NIMBY and LULU Phenomena: Reassessing Our Knowledge Base
and Informing Future Research” (2007) 21:3 J Planning Literature 255 (analyzing the complexity of research related
to ‘locally undesirable land use’ (LULUs) and “not in my backyard” (NIMBY) phenomena in cities); Tee L.
Guidotti and Sheila Abercrombie, “Aurum: a case study in the politics of NIMBY” (2008) 26:6 Waste Management
& Research 582 (examining the importance of the political history of the community in regard to community
responses to LULU and NIMBY phenomenon); Prashan Ranasinghe and Mariana Valverde, “Governing
1

including that of Scott and Valverde, regarding how local actors interface with seemingly neutral
governance bodies to have their interests heard. This section theorizes the particular place of
casinos in city debates. Part II details the two casino decisions in Toronto, which took place over
an eighteen-month period. In the 2012-2013 decision, the Toronto-East York Community Council
(TEYCC) was mobilized as a forum for deliberation. Usually, community councils do not play a
role in “city-wide” debates, and the casino had been designated as a city-wide issue by city staff.
However, in this case, the TEYCC was used to investigate the effects of a casino decision on
“local” issues like traffic and planning. The TEYCC also empowered local actors to play a central
role in the debate. By contrast, in 2015, the debate proceeded through the process for “city-wide”
deliberations, with no community council involvement. Part III brings together the theoretical
literature and case studies to conclude that the institutions of local governance can be reshaped
depending on the local actors involved. This, I suggest, has implications for the inclusivity and
fairness of Toronto’s governance model. In particular, the shift in scale, from local to city, results
in differing degrees of city resources, information, and opportunities for involvement by local
actors.
On the one hand, this is a paper about how provincial law constrains or enables
municipalities to create governing models to make decisions on issues like casinos. On the other
hand, I also seek to understand how institutions are used and acted upon outside of the formal
contours of law. Hence, the paper steps outside of a doctrinal review of applicable legal codes,
employing a mixed methodological approach that combines case studies, semi-structured
interviews with city officials (staff and councillors), and a comprehensive document review of
policy reports and newspaper articles produced in relation to the casino debates. This approach
allows for an exploration of a particular context to understand how the people within interact with
one another and the outside world.7 The aim of this paper and its approach is not to create a grand,
generalized theory of urban governance in Toronto or elsewhere; but instead to understand and
analyze how decision-making occurred in a particular place and time.8 The result is a detailed
analysis of how Toronto’s decision-making bodies can be altered based on the participation of
local actors and what this means for inclusive governance.

I. CITY GOVERNANCE AND UNEVEN DECISION-MAKING
Like most big cities in Canada, Toronto is deeply divided in terms of the socio-economic
status of its residents.9 In one version of the city, we see a growing, prosperous, diverse urban
space. Toronto, with a population of 2.6 million people at the last census count,10 is replete with

Homelessness Through Land-use: A Sociolegal Study of the Toronto Shelter Zoning By-law” (2006) 31:3 Canadian
Journal of Sociology 325 (arguing that NIMBY phenomena related to municipal responses to homelessness are
impacted by the specific “machinery” of municipal law, especially zoning bylaws, which are not guided by
substantive democracy, equality or social justice).
7
Satnam Choongh, “Doing Ethnographic Research: Lessons from a Case Study” in Mike McConville and Wing
Hong Chui (eds), Research Methods for Law (Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 2007) at 70.
8
Gary Thomas, “Doing Case Study: Abduction Not Induction, Phronosis Not Theory” (2010) 16(7) Qualitative
Inquiry 575 at 578. See, contra, Andrew Bennett, Case Study Methods: Dsign, Uses and Comparative Advantages.
9
David Hulchanski, The Three Cities Within Toronto: Income Polarization among Toronto’s Neighbourhoods,
1970–2005. (Toronto: University of Toronto Cities Centre, 2010).
10
City of Toronto, 2011 Census: Population and Dwelling Counts, at 1, online: <https://www.toronto.ca/wpcontent/uploads/2017/10/9726-2011-Census-Backgrounder-Population-Dwelling.pdf > [perma.cc/HCM8-3XZT].

distinctions such as fourth safest 11 and fourth most livable city in the world. 12 This account
portrays Toronto, whose motto is “Diversity Our Strength,” as welcoming, growing, economically
successful, and thriving. 13 However, this vibrant characterization obscures Toronto’s growing
spatial injustice, visible when the lens of analysis zooms to the neighbourhood level. Under this
view, low-income and visible minority residents inhabit different parts of the city than affluent or
middle-class white Torontonians. Scholars Alan Walks and David Hulchanski have written
extensively about the city’s rising levels of income inequality over the last three decades and the
degree to which this inequality is spatialized and overlaid with racial inequality.14As Roger Keil,
Melissa Ollevier and Erica Tsang write, “Toronto’s view of itself as the most diverse city on the
planet usually comes with the bravado of claiming normative superiority in questions of diversity,
too.” 15 The reality is a “paper-thin veneer” of multiculturalism, when in fact, poverty and
inequality are socio-spatially located.16 Since 2009, when Keil, Ollevier and Tsang wrote their
piece, the geographic disparities of low-income and racialized communities have become even
more acute: income inequality is increasing by double the rate in Toronto as compared with the
rest of the country.17 The United Way recently concluded that, “Left unaddressed, Toronto is at
risk of becoming the income inequality capital of Canada.”18
This paper contributes to this conversation by asking how uneven local action affects these
disparities. Illustration 1 shows a map of Toronto that reveals the connection between organized
interest groups like neighbourhood and business improvement associations and the disparity in
income levels described above. As this map shows, there is uneveness across the city in terms of
which spaces have resident and business groups. This matters because of the important role that
these organizations play in local governance, noted by some as integral to the proper functioning
of local democracy, or a “buffer against state centralization.”19 One of the effects of this uneven

11

Economist Intelligence Unit, The Safe Cities Index (2005) at 5, online: <safecities.economist.com/wpcontent/uploads/2015/01/EIU_Safe_Cities_Index_2015_white_paper-1.pdf> [permca.cc:26WK-TEGJ].
12
Economist Intelligence Unit, Global Liveability Ranking (2016) at 6, online:
<www.eiu.com/public/topical_report.aspx?campaignid=liveability2016> [perma.cc:N6YZ-8BK9].
13
Derek Flack, “Toronto named most diverse city in the world,” blogTo (15 May 2016),
online: <http://www.blogto.com/city/2016/05/toronto_named_most_diverse_city_in_the_world/> [perma.cc:7J5K7XTV]. Saskia Sassen, “The Global City: Introducing a Concept (2005) XI:2 Brown Journal of World Affairs 27 at
39.
14
See e.g. Alan Walks, “Income Inequality and Polarization in Canada’s Cities: An Examination and New Form of
Measurement” (Toronto: University of Toronto Cities Centre, 2013), online:
<neighbourhoodchange.ca/documents/2014/04/walks-2013-income-inequality-rp227.pdf> [perma.cc:8NBE-ENSB].
15
Roger Keil, Melissa Ollevier and Erica Tsang, “Why is there no Environmental Justice in Toronto? Or is there?” in
Julian Agyeman, Peter Cole, Randolph Haluza-DeLay, Pat O'Riley eds, Speaking for Ourselves: Environmental
Justice in Canada (Vancouver: UBC Press, 2009) at 66.
16
Ibid. at 66, referencing Kanishka Goonewardena and Stefan Kipfer, “Spaces of Difference: Reflections from
Toronto on Multiculturalism, Bourgeois Urbanism and the Possibility of Radical Urban Politics” (2005) 29:3 Intl J
of Urban and Regional Research 670.
17
Toronto Foundation, “Gap Between Rich and Poor” in Toronto’s Vital Signs Report (2016) at 84, online:
<torontofoundation.ca/wp-content/uploads/2018/02/TVS16FullReport.pdf> [perma.cc/SXL7-SSZ7] Ibid.,
referencing World Council on City Data: WCCD Open City Data Portal. (2015), online: <//open.dataforcities.org/>
[perma.cc/278B-F22C] (Overall, more than 22% of Toronto’s residents live in poverty, similar to Boston and Los
Angeles, and second only to London, UK).
18
United Way, “The Opportunity Equation: Building opportunity in the face of growing income inequality” (2015)
at 3, online:<http://www.unitedwaytyr.com/document.doc?id=285> [perma.cc/NZZ5-A7J5].
19
Theda Skocpol, “The Tocqueville Problem: Civic Engagement in American Democracy” (1997) 21:4 Social
Science History 455 at 457.

governance is the inequality in power that Torontonians have in shaping city spaces. 20 For
example, land use planning processes in many urban centres empower community organizations
to actively participate in decision-making with governments and developers.21
As has been exhaustively researched, such bodies are not demographically neutral and
largely represent homeowners, as well as affluent, white interests. 22 This means that local
associations are not typically located in poorer areas of cities. Even where neighbours in less
affluent areas, try to organize the optics of their action are perceived differently. For example, in
her analysis of voluntary associations in Toronto, Cheryl Teelucksingh states: “[T]he interests of
residents who are able to exercise power become packaged as collective interests, whereas the
interests of the marginalized residents are localized to their own homes and limited spheres of
interest. Marginalized residents … often do not have the resources or opportunity to participate in
advocating their interests.” 23 Thus, more affluent associations are seen as collectives that are
legitimized in civic debates as those who fairly represent a broad constituency, not one-off voices
without community buy-in.

Nicholas Blomley, “Landscapes of Property” (1998) 32:3 Law & Society Rev 567 at 581.
Julian Agyeman and Tom Evans, “Toward Just Sustainability in Urban Communities: Building Equity Rights
with Sustainable Solutions”(2003) 590 The Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science 35 at
48.
22
See e.g. Stephen R. Miller, “Legal Neighborhoods” (2013) 37:1 Harv Envtl L Rev 105; Aaron Moore, Planning
Politics in Toronto: The Ontario Municipal Board and Urban Development (Toronto: University of Toronto Press,
2013); Robert J. Chaskin & David Micah Greenberg, “Between Public and Private Action: Neighborhood
Organizations and Local Governance” (2015) 44:2 Nonprofit and Voluntary Sector Qy 248; Kent E. Portney &
Jeffrey M. Berry, “Mobilizing Minority Communities: Social Capital and Participation in Urban Neighbourhoods”
(1997) 40:5 American Behavioural Scientist 632; Stephen T. Buckman, “Upper Middle Class NIMBY in Phoenix:
The Community Dynamics of the Development Process in the Arcadia Neighborhood? (2011) 19:3 Jl of Community
Practice 308; Chaskin, Robert J. and Sunil Garg, “The issue of governance in neighborhood-based initiatives”
(1997) 32:5 Urban Affairs Rev 631; Mark N. Wexler, “A Sociological Framing of The NIMBY (Not-In-MyBackyard) Syndrome” (1996) 26:1 Intl Rev of Modem Sociology 91 at 92; Peter T. Calcagno, Douglas M. Walker
and John D. Jackson, “Determinants of the Probability and Timing of Commercial Casino Legalization in the United
States” (2010) 142:1-2 Public Choice 69 at 89; Charles Piller, The Fail-Safe Society: Community Defiance and the
End of American Technological Optimism (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1993); Amy Lavine and
Norman Oder, “Urban Redevelopment Policy, Judicial Deference to Unaccountable Agencies, and Reality in
Brooklyn's Atlantic Yards Project” (2010) 42:2 The Urban Lawyer 287 at 289.
23
Cheryl Teelucksingh, “Spatiality and Environmental Justice in Parkdale (Toronto)” (2002) 24:1 Ethnologies 119
at 133.
20
21

Figure 1: Resident Associations, Business Improvement Areas and Income (original
research)
The spatiality of casino location within urban centres triggers important questions relating to the
empowerment of local actors. 24 Particular communities, especially neighbourhood associations
and homeowners, are able to assert claims of ownership over city spaces in order to restrict
unwanted development, which in the downtown Toronto context includes casinos.25 Sytze Kingma
observes that the involvement of interest groups, including neighbourhood associations, cannot be
disassociated from the geography of casinos and their interplay with urban development more
broadly.26 In understanding the geographies of casinos within urban areas, Nicholas Blomley notes
how interest groups can yield significant power in mobilizing successful opposition to casino
development in Vancouver’s downtown core, even while casinos were under development in outer
suburbs in the greater Vancouver area.27 As such, some of the earliest casinos in Ontario are on
First Nation reserve lands, and in rural Ontario or on edges of cities. Even while other forms of
gaming, like bingo, may be restricted to poorer sections of cities,28 casinos themselves are more
likely to be located in in areas with or near sizeable populations and with “underutilized resources,”
represented by high unemployment and housing vacancies.29

Michael Wenz, “The Spatial Evolution of Casino Gambling” (2008) 10:3 Cityscape 203.
Blomley, supra note 20 at 589.
26
Sytze Kingma, “Waterfront Ride: Urban Casino Space and Boundary Construction in the Netherlands” in . Raento
& D Schwartz, eds., Gambling, Space, and Time: Shifting Boundaries and Cultues (Reno: University of Nevada
Press, 2011) 83 at 84.
27
Blomley, supra note 20.
28
Kate Bedford et al, The Bingo Project: Rethinking Gambling Regulation (University of Kent, 2016) at 24, online:
<kar.kent.ac.uk/58505/1/BT_121718_Bingo_v5.pdf> [perma:Y6KE-89DW].
29
Wenz, supra note 24.
24
25

Amidst this landscape of local interests is an expectation that decision-making processes
are fair and uniform across governmental spaces. 30 However some scholars believe that rulemaking should be amenable to change based on citizenry input. In particular, James Scott treats
“top down” processes as planning for an orderly society.31 Using several examples, Scott instead
celebrates informal, street-level practices, stating“[s]trong neighbourhoods, like strong cities, are
the product of complex processes that cannot be replicated from above.”32 Scott briefly uses the
metaphor of a map to observe both planned and unplanned movements within urban spaces.33 The
planned neighbourhood, which shows movements between workplaces and residences is often
“misrepresentative and indeed nonsustainable,” 34 whereas in the second, the unplanned
movements of baby carriages, shopping, strolling, and gazing is “far more complex” and “reveals
different patterns of circulation.”35 Scott concludes that institutions must engage “the enthusiastic
participation of … people.”36 Scott suggests that, “[d]emocracy itself must allow the citizenry to
“continually modify the laws and policies of the land.”37 However, left out of Scott’s account is
the possibility of inequalities, both spatial and socio-economic, whereby some local actors have
the power to modify laws and processes, while others do not.
Mariana Valverde challenged Scott’s oversimplification of municipal planning to argue
that local governments “see like a city,” meaning they employ a combination of practices that use
“both old and new gazes, premodern and modern knowledge formats, in a non-zero-sum manner
and inunpredictable and shifting combinations.”38 Valverde rightfully details the history of zoning
to showcase the medley of top down, orderly rationales alongside informal, resident practices,
local backroom politics, and the many exceptions and exemptions that make Scott’s binary
challenging to accept. 39 As she notes, “a constant stream of exceptions flows out of planning
departments in a routinized manner shows that the ‘seeing like a state’ story does not capture the
realities of planning.”40 The key difference between the Scott and Valverde accounts is the unique
governance of the city that allows local knoweldges and administrative or institional spaces to be
adopted in unpredictable ways.41 To Valverde, cities are constantly invoking old ways of seeing
(like antiquated nuisance arguments) and modern legislation (zoning bylaws), alongside streetlevel politics. Valverde concludes her article with the challenge that “seeing like a city” offers a
different framework of urban governance that, “consists of being able to flexibly use a variety of
legal and regulatory tools of quite contradictory provenances and logics.”42
30

Mariana Valverde, Everyday Law on the Street: City Governace in the Age of Diversity (Chicago: University of
Chicago Press, 2012); Stanley M Makuch & Mathew Schuman, "Have We Legalized Corruption? The Impacts of
Expanding Municipal Authority Without Safeguards in Toronto and Ontario." (2015) 53:1 Osgoode Hall Law
Journal 301, online: https://digitalcommons.osgoode.yorku.ca/ohlj/vol53/iss1/9,
31
Scott, supra note 3.
32
Ibid at 144.
33
For more on the metaphor of the map, see Boaventura de Sousa Santos, “Participatory Budgeting in Porto Alegre:
Toward a Redistributive Democracy” (1998) 26:4 Politics & Society 461.
34
Scott, supra note 3 at 348.
35
Ibid at 347.
36
Ibid at 356.
37
Ibid at 357.
38
Mariana Valverde, “Seeing Like a City: The Dialectic of Modern and Premodern Ways of Seeing in Urban
Governance” (2011) 45:2 Law & Soc’y Rev 277 at 281.
39
Ibid at 289-90.
40
Ibid at 291.
41
Mariana Valverde, “Taking ‘land use’ seriously: toward an ontology of municipal law” (2005) 9 Law Text
Culture 34.
42
Valverde, supra note 38 at 309.

This paper builds on Valverde’s challenge by moving beyond zoning and planning to
further query how local actors can shape the purportedly administratively neutral governance
model within which decision-making takes place. I question how local actors move beyond
influencing debates and outcomes, to influencing the institutional process in which decisions are
made. In particular, I focus on the City of Toronto’s institutional mechanisms for separating local
fromcity-wide issues, which in turn effects the focus of staff information and the degree to which
governance practices are meaningful and participatory. As Santos writes, “the concern has always
been to … improve the mechanisms of representation needed for participatory democracy to
function adequately.”43 This is the focus of this paper: who gets to decide how the institutions of
local governance should be used and shaped? In particular, what does uneven access to decisionmaking tell us about the inclusivity of city governance? This paper ultimately contributes to the
scholarship on spatial justice in urban areas by arguing that local actors do not simply influence
decision-making; they have the capacity to change the governance model itself.

II. THE MUNICIPAL ROLE IN CASINO CREATION
Under Ontario law, a municipal council must approve the placement of a casino within the
boundaries of a city. Likewise, a municipal council has significant discretion in deciding how the
debate will work its way through decision-making bodies.44 However, as this section shows, the
formal processes used to debate the introduction of a casino differed dramatically between
Toronto’s most recent two casino debates. The downtown debate featured the novel use of
Community Councils to serve as a forum for the consideration of local effects of a casino. By
contrast, Community Councils did not play a role in the decision taken a short time later in
Rexdale. I argue that this differing use of governance bodies was based on the presence of local
actors in the downtown debate. Their presence resulted in a significant difference in the availability
of staff resources, the information produced, and the public visibility of each of the casino debates.

A. CONTEXTUALIZING THE DEBATE: THE HISTORY OF GAMBLING
LEGISLATION IN ONTARIO
Understanding the history of gambling legislation in Canada assists in appreciating the
events leading up to the 2012-2013 casino debate. Until 1969, gambling was illegal across Canada
under the Criminal Code of Canada.45 Gambling provisions had origins in English Law, enacted
in the 14th century46 in response to monarchs fearing that their archers “could be lost to ‘idle’
games of dice.”47 This legislation found its way into Canada’s first Criminal Code in 1892 and
prohibited common gaming houses, conducting lotteries, gambling at public conveyances, and
43

Santos, supra note 33 at 486.
See e.g. Community Association of New Yaletown v. Vancouver (City), 2015 BCCA 227 .
45
Ayesha Kapadia, The Issue of Legalized Gambling in Canada (2012), 1 J of History & Political Science at 1,
online: < pi.library.yorku.ca/ojs/index.php/hpsj/article/viewFile/36240/32983 > [perma.cc/2DH3-8YX6]. See also
Colin S. Campbell, “Canadian Gambling Policies,” in Casino State: Legalized Gambling in Canada, James F.
Cosgrave & Thomas R. Klassen, eds., (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 2009) 69 at 79–80.
46
Gaming Act, 1388 (12 Ric. 2, Eng.), c 6.
47
Judith A Osborne & Colin S Campbell, Recent Amendments to Canadian Lottery and Gaming Laws: The
Transfer of Power between Federal and Provincial Governments (1988) 26:1 Osgoode Hall LJ 19 at 22, online:
<digitalcommons.osgoode.yorku.ca/ohlj/vol26/iss1/2 > [perma.cc/T9TH-5AlZ].
44

cheating at play.48 These piecemeal provisions more or less stayed the same until the striking of a
federal joint committee in 1952, which found that existing laws led to fraudulent
activitiesauthorities were unable or unwilling to control. 49 The committee ultimately
recommended relaxing criminal law provisions, but not without offering the following moral
cautions:
The Committee does not wish in any way to give countenance to or
encourage widespread organized gambling through lotteries or other
means. It recognizes that unrestrained gambling would produce
grave moral, social and economic effects in the community and it is
of the opinion that the duty of the state is to ensure that lotteries and
other forms of gambling are kept within limited bounds.50
In 1969 and 1985, legislative changes were made to gambling. While federal prohibitions
against gaming and betting remained the Criminal Code carved out an important exception which
permitted provinces to conduct activities broadly defined as “lottery schemes.”51 The Province of
Ontario moved quickly to introduce sweeping reforms.52 As noted by scholars Colin Campbell and
Gary Smith: “Legal gambling in Canada now operates on a scale that was unimagined thirty years
ago.”53 From 1993 to 1997, the Province of Ontario provided licenses to charities to run temporary
casinos as fundraisers. In 1997, the Province announced that it would develop permanent charity
gaming clubs and introduce video lottery terminals, first at existing charity gaming clubs and
racetracks and then in bars and restaurants. In response, the then City of Toronto, along with each
of the other municipalities of Metro Toronto held referendums in tandem with the 1997 municipal
election. Citizens voted uniformally and dramatically against the establishment of permanent
charity casinos, stopping the initiative from proceeding.54
In Ontario, most gambling activities are subject to a complex regulatory regime and a
provincial crown corporation, the Ontario Lottery and Gaming Corporation (OLG), which reports
to the Minister of Finance. 55 The OLG also has authority to establish a “gaming site” in any
municipality located in Ontario, subject to a crucial limitation: prior to OLG authorization, a
municipal council resolution must be passed supporting the establishment of a gaming site within

48

55-56 Vict C 29.
Canada, Reports of the Joint Committee of the Senate and House of Commons on Capital Punishment, Corporal
Punishment and Lotteries (Queen's Printer, 27 June, 11 July, & 31 July 1956) at 65-66, online: <lareaulegal.ca/JCSHCapital.pdf> [perma.cc/MJJ9-2UF4].
50
Ibid. at 68.
51
Criminal Code, RSC 1985, c C-46,s 207. Under the Criminal Code of Canada, “lottery scheme” means a game or
any proposal, scheme, plan, means, device, contrivance or operation described in any of paragraphs 206(1)(a) to (g),
whether or not it involves betting, pool selling or a pool system of betting.
52
Osborne & Campbell, supra note 47 at 37.
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the applicable municipal boundaries.56 In providing its support, a municipality must seek “public
input into the establishment of the proposed gaming site and give the Corporation, in writing, a
description of the steps it took to do so and a summary of the public input it received.”57 Ironically,
the OLG itself is not obligated to seek public opinion or demonstrate to any government entity the
process it undertook to approve gaming sites.

Figure 1: Map of Toronto’s Study of Casino Locations58
Leading up to the 2012-2013 casino debate, there were some venues available for gambling
in the Toronto area, including a racetrack, slot machines at the Woodbine Racetrack, and bingo
activities, but there were no casino facilities in the city itself.59 In 2010, the Province of Ontario
directed OLG to raise its revenue in the areas of commercial and charitable gaming. 60 Two years
56
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later, the OLG delivered a report which outlined a plan to “modernize” lottery and gaming in
Ontario.61 OLG identified 29 zones across Ontario for locating gaming facilities with the intention
of finding a private sector provider to develop or operate a casino in each zone. OLG’s top choice
for a new casino was in Toronto’s downtown core, identified as the C1 Zone in Illustration 2.62
The Mayor of the by-then amalgamated city, Rob Ford, who had previously represented northern
Etobicoke where Rexdale is located, enthusiastically welcomed the possibility of the casino on the
basis that it would bring significant revenue to the city.63 However, before any new gaming sites
could be developed, provincial legislation required approval from City Council, along with proof
that public input had been sought.64

B. TORONTO’S GOVERNANCE MODEL: LOCAL AND CITY-WIDE
PROCESSES
The decision-making process at City of Toronto follows a different process depending on whether
the matter is city-wide or local, as shown in Figure 1. If a matter is deemed to be city-wide it is
heard through a standing policy committee or by the Executive Committee. The mandate of the
Executive Committee is to “monitor and make recommendations on the priorities, plans,
international and intergovernmental relations, and the financial integrity of the City” including
“Council's strategic policy and priorities in setting the agenda.”65 A casino decision is a city-wide
issue under this definition and therefore is heard by the Executive Committee. The Executive
Committee is chaired by the Mayor, who hand-picks the members from amongst the city’s 44
councillors, usually drafting their staunchest supporters.66 City Council makes the final decision
on almost all matters, regardless of whether the process is local or city-wide.67
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Figure 2: The City of Toronto’s governance model68
The city’s four Community Councils, highlighted in yellow in Figure 2, decide local
issues, mainly in the area of land use and planning.69 Community Councils were created as a hasty
political response to the provincial decision to amalgamate six lower-tier and one regional
municipality in 1998 to create the current City of Toronto. 70 A senior staff member at the City,
who helped design the Community Council model, said, “ Community Councils were a lastminute addition, they were thrown in as a softening blow to amalgamation.”71 It was believed that
these councils would soften the negative response the government received from amalgamation
and would provide for decentralized governance within the province’s new, large municipalities.72
Community Council boundaries, depicted in Illustration 3, roughly match those of the preamalgamated municipalities.73 The bodies were meant to provide stewardship from local planning
matters to “keeping in touch with citizens and their concerns” and to serve as “a focal point for
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involving people in community affairs,”74 but this was not how they ended up being used. City
Council approved a number of guiding principles to help determine which issues should be
considered local and city-wide,75 but in practice, the local issues decided by Community Councils
are those matters delegated under the procedural bylaw, including traffic calming, on-street
parking, and fence exemptions.76 What is considered to be local versus city wide has changed over
the years, and neither staff nor City Council has offered a rationale for the local versus city-wide
binary, nor how to reconcile arguments that an issue could, in fact, be both.77

Figure 3: Map of City of Toronto wards and Community Council boundaries78
The OLG’s preferred area for a casino was in the downtown core, which was the focus of
the 2012-2013 debate. The 2015 debate centered on the expansion of the Woodbine gaming facility
in Rexdale, located in the city’s northwest (Ward 02 in Illustration 3). In both debates, the City
Manager’s Office concluded that: “a citywide perspective should be taken”.79 Like other city-wide
issues, the casino debates would be heard first by the Executive Committee and then ultimately
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decided by City Council.80 However, for the first time since their creation, Community Councils
were used as deliberative forums in a city-wide debate, as described in the next Part.

III. THE DIFFERING RESULTS OF THE 2012-2013 AND 2015
CASINO DEBATES
Toronto City Council made polar opposite decisions as to whether to allow a casino within its
boundaries over an eighteenth month period. The decision to approve the suburban, but not the
downtown proposals, given the different demographics of the areas, is perhaps not surprising,
given what we already know about the power of local residents to influence decisions. However,
what stands out in these cases was the degree to which local actors were not just able to influence
the decision, but to shift the manner in which the city’s governance bodies heard the issue.81 The
Rexdale debate took place amidst the standard city-wide processes, whereas the downtown debate
used a decision-making process that had not previously been seen. Embodying Valverde’s notion
of “seeing like a city,” the shift demonstrated how legal logics like the procedural bylaw are
interconnected with street-level action, such as the involvement of local actors. Local actors did
not simply influence what the decisions would be; their presence permitted a shift in the decisionmaking forum that would hear the issue.

A.
THE 2012-2013 CASINO DEBATE: A LOCAL ROLE FOR A CITYWIDE ISSUE
The first staff report written regarding the 2012-2013 casino debate focused on city-wide concerns
like the operating budget, jobs for city residents, and tourism. 82 Staff were also asked by the
Executive Committee to recommend preferred locations, size, and type of facility, and to negotiate
revenues from the province for hosting a casino, known as the hosting fees. 83 The local effects of
a potential casino, like traffic or the implications for the immediate community around the
proposed site, were not part of this first study.84 The Executive Committee also directed that the
consultation process be overseen by the city’s top bureaucrat, the City Manager’s Office.
Throughout the month of January 2013, City of Toronto staff and consultants oversaw five public
consultation sessions throughout the city,85 conducted a poll, and undertook stakeholder interviews
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to understand whether the public supported the introduction of a casino.86 At the first consultation
session, hundreds of residents demanded more than information about the effects of a casino. A
councillor attending the session stood on a chair and invited participants to an upstairs committee
room to “have an actual conversation.”87 The format for the remaining consultation sessions “was
changed to include presentations by city staff, more formal facilitated discussion groups and the
opportunity to make statements during an open microphone session”.88
Community consultations were soon displaced by the intense campaign that had been
mounted against the idea of a downtown casino.89 The opposition campaign was spearheaded by
No Casino Toronto (NCT), a local advocacy group started by three women in the spring of 2012.90
They objected in particular to Ontario Finance Minister Dwight Duncan’s vision of a casinoanchored “golden mile on Toronto’s waterfront,” stating that it would, “harm neighbourhoods.”91
The involvement of NCT was amplified by their political connections to local councillors.92 The
three women approached downtown councillors very early in the debate to make clear their
opposition.93 They were described as “relentless” at mobilizing support against a casino anywhere
along the city’s downtown.94 Their intention in reaching out to councillors was to strategize on the
nuanced process for decision-making at City Hall.95
NCT was effective at bringing together multiple voices, including other activists 96 and
gathered high-profile members from the arts, business and academia like Richard Florida. 97 They
86
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collaborated across ideological boundaries, including those who opposed a casino on business and
economic grounds. 98 NCT had a steering committee who met regularly to discuss strategy and
included an emphasis on messaging and social media.99 They also used a range of canvassing and
media techniques, including Facebook.100 They built a website, attended meetings and debates,
contacted other organizations, handed out buttons, created an online petition, used a Twitter
account to report news and to live-tweet key City of Toronto meetings, and helped distribute lawn
signs. They used innovative approaches like setting out exactly how residents could sign up to
depute at Executive Committee and what individuals could say,101 and distributing a YouTube
video explicitly for sharing on social media.102 The result was the mobilization of hundreds of
participants at the municipal meetings where the issue was heard.103
Local business improvement areas and neighbourhood associations also joined the
opposition, as did organizations from outside the immediate vicinity , including over two hundred
religious leaders.104 According to one councillor, getting the faith community on board was an
important strategic decision. 105 The Federation of North Toronto Residents Association, an
umbrella organization of resident associations in northern Toronto, was another important catalyst
in mobilizing councillors from outside the downtown core to the “no” side.106 John Sewell, former
mayor of Toronto, wrote:
[F]ew community leaders favour a large casino in downtown
Toronto. As one can see from the ads placed in the daily papers by
No Casino Toronto, virtually everyone who cares about the city and
participates in its public life is opposed. They come from every
sector.107
Pro casino advocates did not mobilize a campaign, nor did they have such a unified voice outside
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of City Hall.108
In the face of this vocal and widespread opposition, local politicians who objected to a
downtown casino considered the standard consultation process – mandated by the Executive
Committee, administered by the City Manager’s Office, and delivered through in-person
consultation sessions and petitions – to be inadequate.109 In response, councillors for the downtown
area advocated for a novel, more formalized local consideration of the issue by using the
procedural bylaw to argue that, “ Community Councils are entitled to hear from the public about
local needs and neighborhood issues.”110 Even though the City Manager had identified that the
decision was one of city-wide interest,111 the TEYCC convened Community Council meetings
staffed by city bureaucrats to inform the public of the casino issue. 112 The use of TEYCC to
deliberate on the local effects of a downtown casino provided resources and attention to the
opposition campaign. A senior staff member explained the committee was a means to “create a
legitimate … political entity that would become a place of energy for the counter argument, the
anti-casino voice.”113 To one of the local councillors, the impetus for the TEYCC’s involvement
was the lack of staff reports available on the local effects of the casino. These are produced when
requested by elected officials:
[W]e didn’t feel like we were getting enough of an opportunity to
evaluate what the impacts were on a local level of a citywide
decision. The decision was very specific, about two neighborhoods,
but, with respect to the Toronto East York Community Council
district, there was no member of the Community Council on
executive where the item was being debated. And we wanted to get
… down into what planning implications, what traffic implications,
what social development impacts … a casino would have on a
neighbourhood.114
The TEYCC was able to create more opportunities for civic engagement, in part via the
production of dozens of staff reports on the impacts of a casino.115 The reports, focused on local
See esp Toronto Life, “The definitive guide to the supporters and opponents of a Toronto casino”, Toronto Life
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108

planning, transportation, and impacts on local businesses, were brought by staff to the TEYCC and
“allowed [councillors] to question staff in far greater detail and to scrutinize the assumptions that
were being made by various actors and players.”116 One councillor said:
What we did have is the ability to create a forum for the casino
exploration and use that forum to get the information we need, … to
get staff in front of us and push them on things like parking
requirements and cost of parking spaces, and vehicle studies and do
all the stuff from the areas where Community Council had
jurisdiction to deal with is as a land use issue.117
Another councillor described the Community Council itself as “a tool of extraordinary
importance,” stating that the TEYCC “gave us … space to think out loud” in contrast to the
Executive Committee, which had become “a decision-making body and not a debating and
research body.”118
The staff reports generated by the Community Council, together with the City Manager’s
final report, were delivered to a special meeting of the Executive Committee held in April 2013,
with options on how City Council could proceed.119 While the City Manager’s report focused on
economic, city building, social, health, and fiscal criteria, the Community Council reports detailed
local impacts like planning and traffic. The Executive Committee meeting had hundreds of
deputants and submissions, largely from those opposed to a casino. After hearing the extensive
opposition, the Executive Committee, whose members had been hand-picked by Mayor Rob Ford
and had been in favour of a downtown casino throughout the debate, approved the creation of a
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downtown casino conditional on a minimum annual hosting fee for the city of $100 million.120
By the time that issue was to be heard by City Council less than a month later, Mayor Ford
had suffered a drug-related scandal, the provincial Liberals had a new premier, and the province
had reversed its position on hosting fees.121 Mayor Ford delayed and then cancelled the special
City Council meeting scheduled for 21 May 2013, declaring the proposals to build a casino in
downtown Toronto “dead” unless OLG could guarantee hosting fees.122 One of the councillors
within the TEYCC area pursued a petition to hold the meeting on 21 May 2013, gathering the
required number of signatures, driving throughout the city over the weekend, and reaching the
Clerk’s Office to file the petition on 19 May 2013 as the bells at Old City Hall rang - just in time.123
At the meeting, City Council rejected the option to have a casino in the downtown core by an
overwhelming majority.124
The scandal involving Mayor Ford was a significant reason for the casino’s ultimate
demise. While this is a fascinating story in its own right, here I am more interested in the process
that was used to hear the debate and, in particular, how the widespread opposition of local actors
allowed for a change in how the issue was debated and decided. As in the land use planning context
that Valverde observed, the 2012-2013 case study unveils the multiple rules and practices that
operate together in the context of municipal governance: vocal activism resulted in a unique use
of the procedural bylaw to use a forum that further magnified this oppositon. The malleability of
the governance model enabled the public in this part of the city to have access to staff resources in
the form of dozens of reports, opportunities for consultation with staff and the institutional
legitimacy these opportunities created. While Scott would have likely appreciated the power of
street-level actors to modify the rules, any such modification was absent when a similar decision
had to be made about a casino proposed for Rexdale a short time later, as we will see in the next
section.
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THE 2015 CITY-WIDE CASINO DECISION
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A municipal election was held on October 25, 2014, a little over one year after the 2012-2013
casino debate, resulting in the replacement of Toronto’s mayor. Between the two casino decisions,
Mayor John Tory replaced Mayor Rob Ford, promising a more professional and transparent
government.125 Rob Ford returned to his previous role as councillor of north Etobicoke, where
Rexdale and the proposed casino site are. Ford’s untimely illness and death meant that he did not
involve himself in the casino debate. A few months after the election, Councillor Crisanti, whose
ward was next to the Woodbine Racetrack, located in Rexdale, re-opened the casino debate.126
Councillor Crisanti had been named deputy mayor, tasked with increasing economic growth in the
Etobicoke-York area of the city.127 Mayor Tory affirmed Councillor Crisanti’s reopening of the
issue, saying, “I have said all the way along that I support us taking a second look at casino
gambling at Woodbine... It’s all about jobs for me. It’s all about jobs and economic development,
not gambling.”128 Crisanti also noted the importance of considering the local voice in any casino
deliberations.129
In early 2015, the Executive Committee requested that the City Manager study the planning
implications of a casino in Rexdale, the economic impact, employment issues, social costs,
incremental costs associated with expanded gaminglike police, fire and emergency medical
services costs. As in the 2012-2013 debate, senior city staff deemed the matter to be a city-wide
issue, which meant that decision-making would proceed through the Executive Committee to City
Council.130 The local effects that had justified the use of Community Councils in the 2012-2013
debate - traffic, local planning, the impact on area businesses - were not included in the laundry
list of information and analysis that the Executive Committee asked the City Manager’s Office to
gather.
The difference between the downtown and Rexdale debates was not really whether the
casino issue was local or city-wide, as indeed these categorizations ignore the overlap in such
designations. Instead, the difference was the relative lack of involvement from councillors or local
advocacy groups, either within or outside of Rexdale.131 In the 2012-2013 debate, the large number
of local actors justified the novel involvement of the Community Council. This in turn led to
greater access to staff resources and far greater information on the ramifications of the casino
proposal. In 2015, there was no opposition campaign, nor did local councillors push for studies of
the local effects of a casino or for involvement by the Community Council. Thus, publicly
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available information and public debate about the effects of a Woodbine expansion were not part
of the conversation at all.
Rexdale is located in Etobicoke, a municipality prior to the 1998 amalgamation of five
entities into the current City of Toronto. The Community Council boundaries do not exactly match
those of the previous city but Rexdale is within the boundaries of the Etobicoke-York Community
Council (EYCC). It is is one of the city’s most economically vulnerable areas. 132 At the time of
the decision, more than half of Rexdale residents were first-generation Canadians;133 nearly 40
percent of working adults had low-wage, part-time jobs without benefits or security; and half of
the resident students dropped out of high school, double the Toronto average.134 The Woodbine
Racetrack represented 10% of the workforce in a community that had seen a 26% decline in jobs
over the last 10 years. It employed 5,000 people in Rexdale alone.135 Crisanti stated at a Woodbine
public consultation meeting, “[I] can tell you that Woodbine has been a great community partner,
they do a wonderful job, and they employ about 7,500 people – and this is also about protecting
the jobs that are currently there.”136 The point about protecting jobs was not elaborated on further,
but the implication was that a vote against adding a casino to the existing Woodbine facilities
would result in losing some of the already limited employment in the area.
In Rexdale, the public engagement process was overseen by the City Manager’s Office.
The most compelling reasons behind supported for casino expansion were the potential creation
of 2,600 new jobs and the promise of a community benefits agreement with the City of Toronto.137
Indeed, support increased to 72 percent when it was suggested that expansion would bring new
commercial development such as hotels, restaurants or entertainment venues,138 even though 70
percent of responders were dubious that expansion would lead to full-time, permanent jobs, and
worried that expansion would contribute to an increase in problem gambling.139 These findings
were echoed in a public consultation session, which had few attendees and proceeded without
controversy. 140 Casino support was based on the potential increase in jobs and the promise –
however dubious residents were – of economic development in an area of the city where it was
badly needed.141 As a former city staff member noted, “nobody really cared, because for them out
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there it was about jobs, it wasn’t about quality of life next door and all these things that come into
play down here [in downtown Toronto].”142 As one columnist wrote:
Rexdale had two options in the casino debate: Take it or leave it.
It’s easy for a councillor to say a casino will bring the wrong kinds
of jobs when the neighbourhood that councillor represents is chock
full of them. In Rexdale, almost any job is better than none.143
This brings to mind Teelucksingh’s analysis of the diminuation of the voices of
marginalized residents, whose interests are localized to their own homes and limited spheres of
interest with little capacity to engage in advocacy.144 It could be that, despite the appearance of
Rexdale resident support, other civic conversations were taking place that did not have access to
city decision-makers. A city staff member, with a long history of community involvement noted,
“it’s not that the communities are not politicized and particularly engaged, it’s just they’re engaged
in ways that you don’t understand and you are not plugged into.”145 This staff person added:
[Councillors need] to say: ‘communities are engaged in ways that
I’m not familiar with, so how can I find out where those
communities’ conversations are taking place, whether they are in
mosques or community centers, or … people’s living rooms,
wherever.’146
A few popular media accounts noted some discord with the proposal to expand Woodbine
from those who lived nearby.147 As one resident noted in one of such articles, there were other
ways of seeing the jobs question, “If you get on building the [Light Rail Transit], we can bring
condo development; we can bring retail development, all sorts of development. I don’t think we
need a casino to be the catalyst for that.”148
But another councillor described it differently, stating that ultimately this was the decision
that the local community wanted: “if the folks in Rexdale want a casino, let them have it.”149 They
added, “If you don’t build the [neighbourhood] association, if you don’t build the activity, if you
don’t engage in that front, you get what you deserve. So, if you’re complacent about it, or apathetic,
or disengaged, or marginalized, there’s a price to pay for that.”150 To this councillor, it is up to the
local community and its councillors to “make its own mistakes.” There is no point in having
outside voices help them to organize or colonize the area:
I’m not going to have time to go up there and orchestrate the
neighbourhood for them. But I have seen people try and do that, it’s
sort of like they’re missionaries going into the suburbs to try and
urbanize somebody. [They have] to make their own mistakes.151
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The involvement of outside voices in the 2012-2013 was not framed as “colonizing” the downtown
core.
In the end, the Executive Committee and then City Council quickly voted to expand the
Woodbine Racetrack to create a casino in Toronto’s northwest with little opposition.152 Unlike the
debate eighteen months earlier, the Community Council and advocates from outside the
geographic area played no role in the debate, beyond the usual cookie-cutter consultation
processes. There were few jobs in Rexdale, very high unemployment rates, and signs of economic
development initiatives coming from either the City or the Province of Ontario were bleak. The
process diminished the contribution of local actors to decision-making, particularly the
contribution of Rexdale residents. It may well be that the ward councillor fully represented the
views of their residents in opting to the promise of new employment to the area. However, the
Rexdale debate demonstrated the degree to which some residents, in some city geographies, are
able to participate in decision-making to such an extent that the process itself transforms, leading
to greater city resources, information and consideration in governance processes.

IV. CONCLUSION: A GOVERNANCE MODEL (RE)CREATED
(UN)EQUAL?
This article has tried to show how urban actors can impact law and governance in one particular
urban context. What I hope is that this research can add to debates about the uneven participation
of local actors and the role that they play in municipal debates, including through the power to
influence how decision-making itself will proceed. These different outcomes on a similar policy
issue tell us that governance is not uniform across the city, not just in terms of the influence of
local actors on decision-making, but also in regard to the ways in which local actor involvement
can lead to shifts in how decision-making takes place. This raises important questions as to the
power of some local actors, and how city governance should be structured in light of this difference
in power.
We already know that governance spaces differ across Toronto, due in part to the presence
of resident and business associations in some, but not all areas of the city, and the way in which
these bodies reflect income disparities and home ownership status. In the 2012-2013 casino
decision, well-connected local actors mobilized an intense campaign against the creation of a
downtown casino and were able to access governmental actors. But what was new was that this
mobilization led to a shift in the decision-making process, whereby the usual city-wide process
was changed to include local considerations through the use of Community Councils. This resulted
in the use of more city resources, including staff time and reports, and greater information
concerning the local impacts of a downtown casino. By contrast, in the 2015 decision, decisionmaking proceeded through the usual city-wide process, without information on the local impacts
of a Woodbine expansion, nor as many opportunities for civic engagement.
A simplistic explanation of the difference between the two decisions is that a downtown
casino would negatively colour the playground of the more privileged residents of the city, who
may not go to or care about Rexdale. As the Toronto Star reported, “most Torontonians couldn’t
care less. Unaware and indifferent, we are happy with it as long as it won’t be in our backyard. Let
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Rexdale enjoy what the rest of us don’t want.”153 The absence of local actors in the 2015 decision
reinforces the extent to which the advocacy groups involved in the earlier debate were dominated
by those who had little interest in events in a poor area like Rexdale. This was the case even though
many of the issues that local actors cared about in 2012-2013 debate - like local jobs - were
mirrored in the 2015 decision.
A more nuanced analysis is that the lack of interest in Rexdale revealed the extent to which
governance bodies are not institutionally neutral, but malleable. In 2012, local actors were able to
influence the formal governance model in a manner that Rexdale residents were not. Local actors
did not just influence the overall debate or the way in which councillors chose their position on
the issue, as Kingma and Blomley have capably recounted. Instead, the impact of local actor
involvement was a shift in the scale of deliberation to Community Councils, allowing deeper
engagement and greater use of staff resources.154 A comparative look at these two decisions reveals
the extent to which local actors can move beyond simply impacting decisions, to demonstrate how
local actors can impact the process of decision-making itself. When combined with Teelucksingh’s
findings as to how particular resident groups and opposition are noticed and integrated, and the
privileging of the voices of particular local actors, these decisions raise distressing questions about
the accessibility and fairness of the governance model.
In order for institutional structures to legitimately capture the “enthusiastic participation”
of its citzens, it must be capable of being reshaped.155 If these structures instead reflect a top-down
approach divorced from the real lives of residents, the administrative framework cannot capture
the activity going on the street. When applied to the casino decisions, we can further see how the
formal rule-making plays out when the power of local actors is ampliflied. Scott might have
applauded the Jane Jacobs-like power of local actors to mobilize such an intensive campaign that
the administrative model had to shift in order to provide a “theatre” (as once staff member put it)
to have their issues considered.156 This shifting did succeed in capturing life on the street, in that
it reflected the power of particular local actors. The contrasting case studies reveal that the power
of local actors is not merely their presence as resident’s or business associations, nor their capacity
to influence decisions. This power can also be seen in their street-level power through the form of
a revised governance model, with the inclusion of Community Councils in a city-wide matter.
However, the casino debates also raise alarm bells regarding how this unique combination
of legal technicalities and insider knowledge that characterizes municipal governance. The legal
technicality of the procedural bylaw included an opportunity to use Community Councils to serve
as a forum for neighbourhood debate and deliberation, as had been contemplated at amalgamation.
However, this combination of legal technicality and insider influence exacerbates the existing
uneveness in Toronto’s governance model. The 2012-2013 debate didn’t simply reflect the power
of residents to influence decision-making in the city’s downtown; it resulted in a change in how
the decision was heard, greater staff resources, more information on the proposal’s implications,
and greater engagement opportunities. The justification for a review of the local effects of a casino
in 2012-2013 debate was relevant in Rexdale eighteen months later, yet the lack of access for local
actors meant that such issues were left unstudied. This is a cautionary tale. Support for street-level
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action, especially where it has the power to change the decision-making process, must pay careful
attention to the spatial and socioeconomic uneveness of cities.
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